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ABSTRACT 
 
Statistical Analysis of the Fourth Case Study in Reverse Auction Research. 
(August 2011) 
Aneesh Madhao Bhalerao, B. Arch, Visvesvaraya National Institute of Technology 
Nagpur 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. John M. Nichols 
 Dr. Boong Yeol Ryoo 
 
 Participating in an auction and winning items by placing bids has been in practice 
since at least 500 B.C. Auctions have evolved since then and anyone can now participate 
in one online and buy items ranging from clothes, electronics, automobiles and homes 
using online auction websites, such as eBay. A Reverse Auction varies from the 
traditional style of Auction where items or services are won by placing successive higher 
bids until the auction ends. The study of Reverse Auction was first introduced to Texas 
A&M University in 2004 and continues today, using a SQL based web system. 
This current research provides a detailed statistical analysis of the fourth case 
study in this long running work. This fourth case study involved the participation of five 
bidders who had no prior experience in Reverse Auctions. A Microsoft Access database 
system and ASP web based user interface was developed and used to conduct these 
initial studies. However, due to the limited capability of the Access system to handle 
more than a limited number of connections or bidders, a Microsoft SQL database and 
web system was developed in 2006 and has been used in all subsequent studies. Case 
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studies have involved up to ten participants. The results from the fourth case study show 
that a Reverse Auction can result in an increase in the average cost of the job to the 
owner. Also, there is evidence of game play amongst the bidders and against the 
purchaser that causes their profits to rise as they gain proficiency in the game. This 
behavior has been termed as ‘tacit collision’, but it is considered a byproduct of the 
system and not illegal behaviour. This study analyzes the fourth study data to investigate 
if the behavior termed “tacit collusion” is evident in the bidding data. This analysis is 
completed by performing a detailed statistical analysis of the bidding data. 
Analysis of the profit percentages illustrates the different stages of the game play 
amongst the bidders. This game play behavior is illustrated by plotting average number 
of bids to the profit made by each bidder. The data clearly suggests that the players 
became efficient in their bidding strategy, although some bidders are more efficient than 
others. This observation negates the common conception that Reverse Auctions will 
result in lowering average costs for the owners.  
The individual data of bidders for bids and profit reveal why some players were 
able to obtain higher than average results and why the others were not. This study can be 
taken further by analyzing the patterns of the successful and unsuccessful players to 
determine what causes them to gain or lose profits. 
 v
DEDICATION 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Mrinalini and Ravi Bhalerao; my brother, 
Eeshan Bhalerao and lastly my fiancé, Sneha Nayar; without their support and love my 
education in the US would never have been possible.  
 vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Of all the people I would like to thank, first I want to extend my sincere gratitude 
to Dr. John Nichols for creating and nurturing my interest in this area of research. 
Without his support this work would have never turned out the way it did. I would thank 
my other committee members, Dr. Boong Ryoo and Dr. Kevin Glowacki for their 
guidance and help throughout the course of this research. 
Next, I would like to thank all the previous students who did excellent work in 
the research of Reverse Auction Bidding. Their work encouraged me to attain a higher 
level of success.  
All my fellow batch mates, friends and colleagues at Texas A&M University, a 
big thanks to all for making my stay extremely gratifying. Also thanks to all my 
professors, Department Head and staff at Construction Science for their help and 
exceptional support throughout my course. 
Finally, thanks to my mother and father for their encouragement and to my fiancé 
for her patience and love. 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
              Page 
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................  iii 
DEDICATION ..........................................................................................................  v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................  vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................  vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................  ix 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................  xii 
CHAPTER 
 I INTRODUCTION ................................................................................   1 
   Background ....................................................................................  1 
   Research Objectives .......................................................................    4 
   Guiding Questions ..........................................................................   5 
   Limitations and Delimitations ........................................................   5 
   Significance of the Study ...............................................................   6 
    
 II LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................  8 
   Introduction ....................................................................................  8 
   Prior Studies  ..................................................................................   8 
   Theoretical Framework Used for the Case Study ..........................    9 
   Definitions ......................................................................................  9 
   Game Type .....................................................................................  18 
   Reverse Auction Bidding – The Game ..........................................  19 
 
III  METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................      32 
 
  Introduction ....................................................................................      32 
  Distinctive Elements to the Original Study ....................................      32 
   Inconsistency in Data  ....................................................................   39 
 
                    
 viii
CHAPTER             Page 
 IV RESULTS .............................................................................................  42 
                        
                  Introduction ....................................................................................      42 
  Comparing Bidding Trends ............................................................      43 
                  Descriptive Statistics of the Bid Data ............................................      52 
                  Descriptive Statistics of the Winning Job Data ..............................      56 
                  Bid Period Comparison ..................................................................      64 
                  Differential Bid Data ......................................................................      80 
 V ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS .........................................................  92 
                  Bidding Data ..................................................................................      92 
                  Bidding Patterns .............................................................................      93 
                  Game ω ...........................................................................................      94 
                  Game α ...........................................................................................      95 
 VI CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................  98 
REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................  100 
VITA .........................................................................................................................  102 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
                                                                                                                                       Page 
 
Figure 1 Recommended Steps for a Successful Reverse Auction .........................  20 
 
Figure 2  Reverse Auction Bidding General Algorithm .........................................  21 
 
Figure 3 Login Screen ...........................................................................................  22 
 
Figure 4    Location of Construction Sites in Houston ..............................................  23 
 
Figure 5 ‘All Current Bids’ Page - Screenshot ......................................................  28 
Figure 6 ‘My Bids Info’ Page - Screenshot ...........................................................  29 
 
Figure 7 ‘Completed Jobs’ Page - Screenshot .......................................................  30 
Figure 8 ‘Bank Guarantee’ Page - Screenshot .......................................................  30 
Figure 9 ‘Higher Bid Price Warning’ Page - Screenshot ......................................  31 
Figure 10 Gaussian Distribution Against Job Distribution Probability per Week ..  33 
Figure 11 Profit Distribution ...................................................................................  35 
Figure 12 Normalization of Profit Percentages .......................................................  36 
Figure 13 Histogram of Frequency of Ξ ..................................................................  38 
Figure 14 Percentage of Jobs Won by Each Bidder ................................................  39 
Figure 15 Missing Bid Data ......................................................................................  40 
Figure 16 Job Profit Data from van Vleet ...............................................................  43 
Figure 17 Bid Distribution .......................................................................................  45 
Figure 18 Distribution of Winning Bids ..................................................................  46 
Figure 19 Job Profit Data Relative to Costs ............................................................  47 
 x
                                                                                                                                       Page 
 
Figure 20 Job Profit Data Relative to Costs with Addition of Trend Line ..............  48 
Figure 21 Job Profit Data Relative to Costs with Polynomial Trend Line ..............  49 
Figure 22 Identifying the Bidding Trends in Gujarathi’s Data ................................  50 
Figure 23 Comparing the Loan Amount to the Profit Made ...................................  55 
Figure 24 Jobs Won by Bidders ...............................................................................  58 
Figure 25 Profit Percentages - Bidder 1 ..................................................................  59 
Figure 26 Profit Percentages - Bidder 2 ..................................................................  59 
Figure 27 Profit Percentages - Bidder 3 ..................................................................  60 
Figure 28 Profit Percentages - Bidder 4 ..................................................................  60 
Figure 29 Profit Percentages - All Bidders ..............................................................  61 
Figure 30 Frequency of Winning Bids in Profit Percentage - Bidder 1 ..................  62 
Figure 31 Frequency of Winning Bids in Profit Percentage - Bidder 2 ..................  62 
Figure 32 Frequency of Winning Bids in Profit Percentage - Bidder 3 ..................  63 
Figure 33 Frequency of Winning Bids in Profit Percentage - Bidder 4 ..................  63 
Figure 34 Frequency of Winning Bids in Profit Percentage - All Bidders ..............  64 
Figure 35 Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 1 ...................................................  70 
Figure 36 Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 2 ...................................................  70 
Figure 37 Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 3 ...................................................  71 
Figure 38 Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 4 ...................................................  71 
Figure 39 Bid Distribution per Minute - All Bidders ..............................................  72 
Figure 40 Highest, Lowest and Average Bids per Minute ......................................  73 
 xi
                                                                                                                                       Page 
 
Figure 41 Average Bids per Minute ........................................................................  74 
Figure 42 Histogram Showing Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 1 ..................  75 
Figure 43 Histogram Showing Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 2 ..................  76 
Figure 44 Histogram Showing Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 3 ..................  77 
Figure 45 Histogram Showing Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 4 ..................  78 
Figure 46 Histogram Showing Bid Distribution per Minute - Highest Ranking 
  Bidder from van Vleet’s Case Study .......................................................  79 
Figure 47 Plot Showing Average Bids per Job to Number of Jobs Won ................  90 
Figure 48 Plot Showing Average Bids per Job to Profit Made ...............................  91 
 
 xii
LIST OF TABLES 
                                                                                                                                  Page 
Table 1 Previous Reverse Auction Bidding Studies ..............................................  8 
Table 2 Construction Site Locations, Travel and Material Costs ...........................  24 
Table 3 Rain Data for Week 1 ................................................................................  25 
Table 4 Number of Jobs per Week .........................................................................  34 
Table 5 Frequency of Values of Ξ ..........................................................................  37 
Table 6 Bidding Data .............................................................................................  41 
Table 7 Trend Periods in van Vleet’s Data ............................................................  44 
Table 8 Chauhan’s Postulated Bidding Trend Periods ...........................................  50 
Table 9 Comparison of Data Using Student’s T-Test ............................................  51 
Table 10 Comparison of Trend Periods ...................................................................  52 
Table 11 Frequency of Bids per Job per Week ........................................................  53 
Table 12 Comparing Number of Bids to Number of Jobs Won by Bidders ............  54 
Table 13 Profit Data for Each Bidder .......................................................................  55 
Table 14 Bid Efficiency of Bidders ..........................................................................  56 
Table 15 Profit Efficiency of Bidders ......................................................................  56 
Table 16 Profit Efficiency of Bidders from van Vleet’s Data ..................................  57 
Table 17 Bids Made per Minute - Bidder 1 ..............................................................  65 
Table 18 Bids Made per Minute - Bidder 2 ..............................................................  66 
Table 19 Bids Made per Minute - Bidder 3 ..............................................................  67 
Table 20 Bids Made per Minute - Bidder 4 ..............................................................  68 
 xiii
                                                                                                                                       Page 
 
Table 21 Bids Made per Minute - All Bidders .........................................................  69 
Table 22 Highest, Lowest and Average Bids per Minute ........................................  73 
Table 23 Coefficients of Third Order Polynomial Trend Line.................................  80 
Table 24 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs Won by Bidder 1 .................................  81 
Table 25 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs Won by Bidder 2 .................................  82 
Table 26 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs Won by Bidder 3 .................................  83 
Table 27 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs Won by Bidder 4 .................................  83 
Table 28 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs ..............................................................  84 
Table 29 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs from van Vleet’s Data .........................  86 
Table 30 Money Lost in Winning Bids ....................................................................  88 
 
 1
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
BACKGROUND 
 One of the common and widely used method for securing construction jobs today 
is the hard bid method (or closed bid) (Gregory 2006). The wide success of this method 
can be attributed to its potent characteristic of being unprejudiced to all the bidders. A 
deadline is set to submit the bids in person at a pre-decided location and time. Bids 
submitted earlier than the deadline remain closed and unknown to all players involved, 
including the owner. The bids are opened only after the deadline is over and only the 
owner can compare the prices, although at some locations the bid price is published, 
although without analysis to check the bids correctness this is to some extent 
meaningless. The owner will award generally the job to the lowest qualified bidder 
(Gregory 2006). Due to the open nature of this bidding, this system is considered ethical 
and remains a popular choice amongst the people in construction industry. However, the 
perceived shortcomings of the hard-bid method have given way in part to other methods 
of job procurement. Advancement in technology and especially the development of the 
internet has bought a revolution in almost all old-school methods of life and the 
construction industry is no exception.  
 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Adult Education Quarterly. 
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The internet has made it possible to bring together buyers and suppliers on a 
broader scale, eliminating the need for their physical presence in bidding for prospective 
jobs. The buyers and sellers are also struggling to find the methods to implement the use 
of internet in the most effective manner in all industries (Jap 2003), including the 
purchasing of goods and services. 
Reverse Auction systems use in the construction industry has been a long 
debated topic, essentially related to whether the system is ethical, putting aside that 
issue, the question of interest is whether this system is economically more efficient than 
hard bids.  
In a Reverse Auction the traditional auction system is reversed, instead of the 
buyer there are prequalified sellers. The operation is typically carried out over the web; 
where the sellers place bids descending in price and the buyer accepts the lowest bid; 
either when the time runs out or when no seller is willing to offer a lower price. Goods 
are bought and sold, and information is exchanged among buyers and sellers in a private 
(i.e. hosted by a single company) or a public (i.e. with many firms) electronic market 
place. Reverse auctions previously used extensively in the chemical industry are now 
being used increasingly for products and services related to day-to-day maintenance, 
repair and operations requirements (Edward 2004).  
The game play difficulty with Reverse Auction is the open nature of the trading, 
all prices are instantly visible, which provides potential economic advantage to some, 
but not necessarily the purchaser. Transparency is assured but the competition form from 
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the hard bid is changed, which is at the core of this research interest, is this change 
economically healthy.  
 According to OED (Little, Fowler et al. 1973) a market is defined as ‘the meeting 
together of people for the purchase and sale of provisions or livestock, publically 
exposed, at a fixed time and place; the time of this; also the assembled company, with 
minimal outside intervention and providing transparency to the hagglers’. The internet 
has made it possible to break this concept of a ‘market’ when the seller and buyers 
cannot come together at the same place. The idea of Reverse Auction accomplishes this 
goal; however they are considered unethical and an unconventional form of bid shopping 
by some contractors. Nichols (2009) considers Reverse Auction systems, when operated 
by an independent entity of the purchaser, represents an electronic equivalent of a free 
market. In construction law, Bid Shopping is the practice of revealing a prospective 
seller’s (contractor’s) quoted price to other prospective sellers (or contractors) with an 
intention to lower the cost of the bid. Lowering the cost of a bid would require cost-
cutting measures mainly in labor and materials; and hence is thought by some to 
typically lower the quality of the work performed. Some states have recognized the 
unfair nature of bid shopping and acknowledged the fact that it would lead to lower 
quality and loss of professional ethics. There are laws in place to discourage and 
eliminate the practice of bid shopping. 
 Guhya (2010) undertook a detailed statistical analysis of the first case study done 
by van Vleet (2004) and suggested that the overarching game in Reverse Auction is a 
combined multiplayer game with two sub-games. The α game is a multiplayer game 
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between the bidders with an intention to seek economic advantage over the other 
bidders. The ω game is the game between the bidder group and the purchaser; however 
the ω game in reality is a two player game with an intention to maximizing returns of the 
bidding group (λ player) at the expense of the purchaser (υ player).  
The objective of this research is to continue the analysis by Guhya (2010) for the 
fourth case study, after his initial seminal work on the first case study. A total of 
fourteen case studies have been completed in this Reverse Auction research. This is the 
second detailed statistical study of the initial case studies. This study reviews the data 
from the fourth case study, completed by (Gujarathi 2008), using the analysis techniques 
and algorithms established by Guhya (2010). The work allows a comparison of the 
results collected by Gujarathi (2008) and van Vleet (2004). The study goes further by 
investigating the trends in bidding patterns and observation of tacit collision. The fourth 
case study, completed by Gujarathi in 2008 using four participants, and is considered to 
show the probable occurrence of tacit collusion in the Reverse Auction system play. This 
case study used the Access software developed by Kim (2004). The profit percentage 
graphs developed from the data showed no learning curve amongst the participants; who 
had no prior experience in Reverse Auction Bidding, but showed significant game skill 
to consistently maximize their profits at the start and towards the end of the game. The 
current research interest in the ongoing study is to investigate the game play. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The research objectives for this study are based on the methods established by 
Guhya (2010), which are: 
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1. Establish plots of the bidding data 
2. Compare the bidding patterns shown in the plots with time for all bidders 
3. Determine if evidence exists in the bidding data to confirm the existence of the ω 
game and does it represent some form of collusion 
4. Compare the returns of the different bidders in the α game to determine if there 
are any differences in bidding returns and does it represent some form of 
collusion 
GUIDING QUESTIONS 
Questions addressed by this study are: 
1. What are different learning trends that can be observed from the profit 
percentages? 
2. How different are these learning trends with respect to each other? 
3. What causes the sudden increase in average profits? Is this the correct indicator 
of collusion? 
4. Is there a specific player that causes the sudden rise? How can this player be 
identified? 
LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 
The scope of this study is based on the following factors: 
1. All players involved in this game were from the Department of Construction 
Science, Texas A&M University; faculty and graduate students from the 
Department of Construction Science acted as the bidders in the game and had no 
prior experience in Reverse Auction Bidding 
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2. The study was performed under controlled settings with limited variables that 
exist in a real business scenario, eliminating most risks involved in business 
transactions; thus allowing the research learn to focus on the bidding patterns of 
the bidders 
3. The study ignores any clerical errors on part of the bidders, like missing a digit 
when entering a bid and the legal conflicts that would follow as a result 
4. This case study represents a sample size of one; meaning that it constitutes a case 
study, primarily applicable to the selected population with Herfindahl Index 
(Justice 2011) of 2500 
5. Steady economic conditions were assumed for the study period 
6. The data obtained from Gujarathi’s (2008) case study will be used in analysis and 
results compared to data from van Vleet’s (2004) initial case study 
7. There were some inconsistencies observed in Gujarathi’s data (2008), which will 
be discussed later 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 According to Gujarathi (2008), ‘It is important to analyze the techniques 
developed and employed by the bidders during the game which would help to understand 
the game strategy of the players and allow for a real review of the ethics of the bidding 
system.’  
van Vleet (2004) also mentioned that ‘In order to accurately assess the 
implications of reverse auctions, it is essential to know and understand the behaviors of 
those who engage in the bidding process. Without a method of evaluating the process, it 
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is impossible to clearly understand whether Reverse Auction Bidding is a success or 
not’.  
This study attempts to extract the crucial results from Gujarathi’s (2008) data 
using the analysis techniques used by Guhya (2010) to establish the presence of tacit 
collusion and determine the techniques to prove the same. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Fourteen case studies on the Reverse Auction system have been completed at 
Texas A&M University, this study specifically looks at the case study work by Gujarathi 
(2008) and attempts to extract the crucial results from Gujarathi’s (2008) data using the 
analysis techniques developed by Guhya (2010). The purpose is to look for the presence 
of tacit collusion in the bidding system. This chapter presents the definitions, game type 
and provides a more detailed review of Reverse Auction Bidding system as outlined 
initially by Chauhan (2009) in terms of game play. 
PRIOR STUDIES 
A list of some of the previous Reverse Auction Bidding Studies is presented in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 Previous Reverse Auction Bidding Studies 
Year Researcher Participants Herfindahl Index Remarks 
2004 van Vleet 5 2000 Competitive 
2006 Gregory 10 1000 Very competitive 
2008 Chauhan 5 2000 Competitive 
2008 Gujarathi 4 2500 Less competitive 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK USED FOR THE CASE STUDY  
The purpose of van Vleet’s professional paper was to establish a controlled 
setting in which a select group of diverse individuals were placed in a controlled and a 
competitive environment with one undisputed objective: to maximize profits. Using the 
information from a report posted in Fortune 500 in 1987 for return on investment 10% 
return on equity was used as a baseline determining factor for evaluating participant 
performance (Oster 1990; van Vleet 2004). 
For the purpose of van Vleet’s study, economics of scale were not applied nor 
were the construction costs changed with a change in the project. Construction delivery 
methods of project delivery system were also excluded so that there could be no 
possibility of reducing time for the construction process. 
For the purpose of the inline simulation model, the participants, pre-selected for 
the game, are assumed to be from firms of the similar scale with similar annual revenues 
so as to avoid the conflicts of interest that may arise between a large and a small firm. 
Also, the controlled simulation eliminated the entry of new competitors in the bid 
and therefore no entry pressures were generated (van Vleet 2004). The importance of 
these points is that the research is assumed to occur during a stable market period, such 
as existed in 2004. 
DEFINITIONS 
 The terms used in this study have been previously used and established by, van 
Vleet (2004), Gregory (2006), Panchal (2007), Chaudary (2009), Chauhan (2009) and 
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Guhya (2010). This study only outlines the definitions from these previous studies. The 
definitions are as given below and maintain the exact wording developed by others: 
λ player This represents the bidder group, treated as a single entity 
for the purpose of game analysis. 
λi player The ith bidder in the bidding group. 
υ player This represents the purchaser. 
α game The postulated sub-game played between bidders in 
seeking economic advantage over the remaining bidders. 
This game almost always disadvantages the υ player, but 
the υ player created the system and so is responsible for 
the υ player’s economic losses as a result. 
ω game The postulated sub-game played within the Reverse 
Auction Bidding game between the purchaser and the 
bidders. In terms of this analysis, it is deemed to 
effectively reduce to a two-player game, with competition 
implications for all players. The υ player in reality sees 
only the average of all won bids. 
τ Bid time allowed for each round of play in the game. 
δ Period between bid time τ that represents the work time in 
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the game. 
Bj ith bid 
Bv Accepted bid for each job. 
K This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the υ 
player’s base price, although in this game K is a vector of 
costs.  
Γ This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the υ 
player’s maximum incremental price above K. 
Ξ This variable is normally defined by the set of numbers  
(Ξ| 0˂ Ξ ≤ 1), although negative values of Ξ are permitted 
by the Reverse Auction Bidding system. Ξ is used to 
normalize the profit data. A negative Ξj represents a loss 
on direct costs to the λi player who makes this type of bid, 
and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt player. 
This type of play is discouraged as the assumption in the 
game is steady state economic conditions in the outside 
economy. Future studies may look at a failing market, but 
that is beyond this study. 
Aggressive Bidder: Willing to accept calculated risk of greater than average 
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loss in pursuit of greater than average returns, first defined 
by Chouhan (2009). 
Bid: A single entry into the game that represents a legally 
acceptable offer to complete the work assuming the bidder 
has been prequalified. 
Bidder:  An entity that submits a bid. In this game, there are 
usually three to ten bidders, and each is an individual, 
rather than a company. In van Vleet’s (2004) study, none 
of the bidders had prior experience, which is not true for 
Chauhan’s (2009) study. 
Bid Efficiency: Is the ratio of the total number of jobs won to the total 
number of bids. This is one of the postulated metrics for 
determining success in the α game. 
Case Study: ‘Designed to study intensely one set (or unit) of 
something; for e.g. programs, cities, counties, worksites-
as a distinct whole, with the goal of understanding the set 
as a distinct whole in its particular context. A case study 
reveals the process and outcome at certain sites and the 
way in which these interrelate. Case studies are conducted 
primarily using qualitative techniques, but do not exclude 
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quantitative data (van Vleet 2004)’. 
Collusion: A secret agreement between two or more parties for a 
fraudulent, illegal or deceitful purpose (van Vleet 2004). 
Or as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (Little, 
Fowler et al. 1973) as ‘secret agreement or understanding 
for the purpose of trickery or fraud’ is generally 
considered to be reprehensible and is usually illegal in a 
free market system, because of the economic distortions 
introduced into the market. 
Dutch Auction: is a type of auction where the auctioneer begins with a 
high asking price which is lowered until some participant 
is willing to accept the auctioneer's price, or a 
predetermined reserve price (the seller's minimum 
acceptable price) is reached (van Vleet 2004). 
Economic Winner: An individual who generated the highest average returns. 
Panchal (2007) coined this term to indicate a more 
successful player in the α game. An economic winner 
makes no direct difference to the ω game for the υ player 
where the υ player has an objective of minimizing the 
average bid for the game. The υ player sees the average 
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price for purchases and a distribution of prices. 
Economic Loser: An individual who generated the lowest average returns. 
Panchal (2007) coined this term to indicate a less 
successful player in the α game. An economic loser makes 
no direct difference to the ω game for the υ player where 
the υ player has an objective of minimizing the average 
bid for the game. 
Efficiency: The ratio of the output to the input of any system. 
Game: A series of jobs for the construction of a reinforced 
concrete floor slab, each game lasts approximately 8 to 10 
weeks in game play time, with each round of the game 
modeling a week and occurring in a 20 minute period, 
with 15 minutes of bid time and 5 minutes of build time. 
Game theory: A formal analysis of conflict and cooperation among 
intelligent and rational decision makers. 
Job: A work unit, in this case a reinforced concrete slab for a 
home builder, taking 5 working days to construct. 
Loan amount: It is a bank loan or a guarantee taken by the bidder with 
the purpose of increasing the bidders’ job capacity. The 
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cost is $500 per job. 
Loss: Negative return applied to a business undertaking after all 
operating expenses have been met. 
Lump Sum offer: A tender submitted for a lump sum amount in the game 
assumed to be for a fixed price. 
Pre-Qualified: The process of declaring competent or capable or to 
certify in advance. The purpose of prequalified is to 
maintain the economic competition. 
Profit: The return received on a business undertaking after all 
operating expenses have been met. 
Profit Efficiency: 
 
It is the ratio of the profit made to the number of jobs won. 
This is one of the postulated metrics for determining 
success in the α game. 
Purchaser: Either an owner or owner’s representative who organizes 
the bid or tender document. 
Reverse Auction Bidding: It is a single or multiple-item, open, descending-price 
auction. The initiator specifies the opening bid price and 
bid decrement. Each bidder submits a successively lower 
bid. At the end of the auction, the bidder with lowest bid 
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value is being considered as a winner (van Vleet 2004). 
Second Bidder Issue: It has been postulated that the lowest bidder in Reverse 
Auction Bidding is seeking to undercut the second bidder 
by the smallest quantifiable fragment, if the bidder 
understands the principles of tacit collusion (Chaudary 
2009). The hypothesis forms the basis for future research. 
Sealed Bidding: In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit 
bids in such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any 
other participant. The highest/lowest bidder is awarded 
the contract at an agreed price, all other things being 
equal .(van Vleet 2004). 
Sherman Antitrust Act: The act, based on the constitutional power of Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce, declared illegal every 
contract, combination (in the form of trust or otherwise), 
or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and foreign trade. 
According to Nichols (2010), the problem is tacit 
collusion does not fit within the meanings of the act, thus 
leading to the debate about the legality of RAB between 
contractors who consider it illegal or unethical and 
economists who accept the converse. 
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Tacit Collusion: Seemingly independent, but parallel actions among 
competing firms (mostly oligopolistic firms) in an industry 
that achieve higher prices and profits, much as if guided 
by an explicit collusion agreement. Also termed implicit 
collusion, the distinguishing feature of tacit collusion is 
the lack of any explicit agreement. The key is that each 
firm seems to be acting independently, perhaps each 
responding to the same market conditions, but the end 
result is the same as an explicit agreement. This should be 
contrasted with explicit or overt collusion that does 
involve a formal, explicit agreement. Tacit collusion is 
observed in Reverse Auction Bidding, and is potentially 
related to the Second Bidder Issue (Chauhan 2009). 
Nichols (2010) postulates that the α game has been 
observed and misunderstood as tacit collusion, in reality it 
can be viewed potentially reviewed as an aggressive 
player seeking a better than average return from the profit 
distribution resulting from the α game. 
Traditional bidding: In this type of auction all bidders simultaneously submit 
bids in such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any 
other participant. The highest/lowest bidder is assumed to 
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be awarded at the price submitted provided no other 
contracts opened on the decision process (Chaudary 
2009). 
Winners Curse: Problem faced by uninformed bidders or poor game 
players. For example, in an initial public offering 
uninformed participants are likely to purchase larger 
allotments of issues that informed participants know are 
overpriced. 
 
GAME TYPE 
Consider a Reverse Auction Bidding game where the υ player is willing to accept 
bids of the type shown in equation (1): 
Bj = K + Ξj Γ       (1) 
Γ represents the upper limit the υ player is prepared to pay in the game above the 
nominal minimum bid amount K. A negative Ξj represents a loss on direct costs to the λi 
player who makes this type of bid, and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt 
player (Guhya 2010). The concept of Γ can be attributed to Feigenbaum (Nichols 2010), 
who considered there had to be an upper limit everyone was prepared to pay for a 
service or good, the so called price point of economic theory. 
The bidding period for each game lasts for a set time, τ, in this case it is 15 
minutes. The total cost for υ player is shown in equation (2): 
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,      (2) 
This total cost is based on the accepted lowest bid for each job, where the λi 
player submitted a valid bid for a job. Each λi player then has a unique set of bids and a 
unique set of jobs, with a total return to the λi player defined by a simple summation 
(Guhya 2010). In terms of the υ player, the average cost per job and the total cost are the 
main elements. The lowest and highest costs are of interest, but the υ player’s clear 
objective must be to lower the average price. This is not necessarily the key objective of 
the other players, who seek economic advantage in a range of costs. 
REVERSE AUCTION BIDDING – THE GAME 
 The Reverse Auction game played by Gujarathi (2008) follows the same rules 
established by the game played by van Vleet (2004) with the only difference in the 
number of players from 5 (van Vleet) to 4 (Gujarathi). The Herfindahl Index in case of 
van Vleet was 2000 whereas in Gujarathi’s case study was 2500, which indicates a less 
competitive market and a higher chance of collusion, making this an ideal vehicle to 
study tacit collusion.  
 Herfindahl Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market 
concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the 
market and then summing the resulting numbers. Markets in which the HHI is between 
1000 and 1800 points are considered to be moderately concentrated and those in which 
the HHI is in excess of 1800 points are considered to be concentrated (Justice 2011). 
Figure 1 shows the ideal steps to be undertaken to execute a successful reverse auction. 
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Figure 1 Recommended Steps for a Successful Reverse Auction (Chaudary, 2009) 
 For the scope of the study Step 4 in Figure 1 was executed using a web based 
data system. This was done using the website and game scenario developed by van Vleet 
in 2004. Microsoft Access and ASP Programming were used to connect a database to the 
website which would provide information to the participants and also record their data. 
The typical process of running a game was summarized by Guhya (2010) and is given in 
Figure 2. The process continues until time allotted for a game (15 minutes in Gujarathi’s 
case) runs out. This time frame of 15 minutes is established for practical reasons of 
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conducting research, which otherwise represents a full week in a real life scenario in the 
game. 
 
Figure 2 Reverse Auction Bidding General Algorithm (Guhya 2010) 
 The game scenario developed by van Vleet is described below.  
 The bidders were assigned an individual login and password that enabled them to 
login to the website.  
 Once logged in, the bidders were able to access only relevant information to the 
bidding process.  
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 Four login names were created, Driver, Concrete, Hammer and Pliers, each were 
assigned a unique bidder id from one to four and given a unique password. 
Figure 3 shows the login page of the website. 
Figure 3 Login Screen 
 All construction sites were selected in the Houston area as shown in Figure 4. 
Each job site was assigned a unique site ID. To ensure that each job site was represented 
in the entire simulation process, two dice were rolled to determine the number of jobs in 
a week. Thus the minimum number of jobs possible were two and maximum possible 
were twelve. 
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Figure 4 Locations of Construction Sites in Houston (MapQuest 2006) 
 The purchaser’s office was assumed to be located in Sugarland, TX. Thus each 
job site was assured to have different travel and delivery costs associated. These costs 
were assumed to be directly proportional to the proximity of the job site to the 
purchaser’s office. Thus the further the job site from the purchaser’s office, the higher 
would be the travel and delivery costs. The assumption made by van Vleet is that the 
subcontractors would be located close to the contractor. This is a research assumption 
for developing a game such as for this study. Alternative assumptions could be made in 
further studies. 
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 For the purpose of the game, these costs were notified to the bidders along with 
the base cost of the project. Table 2 displays the location of sites with their associated 
costs.  
Table 2 Construction Site Locations, Travel and Material Costs 
Site 
Number 
Location of 
Development 
Distance from 
Sugarland 
(kilometers) 
Cost of 
Travel 
($) 
Cost of Material 
Delivery 
($) 
Total 
Cost 
($) 
1 Brookside Village 42 858 624 1482 
2 Piney Point Village 24 495 360 855 
3 Highlands 71 1452 1056 2508 
4 Jersey Village 40 825 600 1425 
5 Bunker Hill Village 27 561 408 969 
6 Richmond 14 297 216 513 
 
 To introduce variability in the auction, rain delay is introduced to the game. Data 
obtained from a NOAA website shows the rain probability in the Houston area between 
the months of May and June. This is the time of the year selected by van Vleet for his 
model game. 
Gujarathi (2008), based on the NOAA data, assumed 27% chances of rain per 
day and used a randomly generated data table from Excel to determine whether it was  a 
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rain day or non-rain day on a particular site. Table 3 shows the rain and non-rain days in 
week 1 for all sites. Similar tables were used for all weeks. 
Table 3 Rain Data for Week 1 
Day Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Monday 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Tuesday 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Wednesday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thursday 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Friday 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Saturday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sunday 0 1 0 1 0 0 
 
In Table 3, 0 represents no delay by rain and 1 represents delay of one day due to 
rain. The idea of rain delay mainly had an effect on the work capacity of the bidder. A 
delay of one day did not cause any change in bid capacity as the time for completion was 
five days and the work week was six days. However a two day delay in a week meant 
that the job would be rolled over to the other week, thus reducing the bidder’s bid 
capacity by one for bidding jobs in the next week. This accounted for some of the real 
life contingencies in a real project scenario. 
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 The rules of the game are: 
1. The purchaser builds only one type of home and each job is to pour only one type 
of slab. Thus the nominal costs for the jobs are same except the travel and 
delivery costs. 
2. All bidders are pre-qualified and hence only the final price matters, as in a real 
auction. 
3. The purchaser posts the available jobs for the week on Monday. 
4. Each bidder has $30,000 in their bank account at the start. 
5. Base cost of every job is $10,000 excluding the travel and material delivery 
costs, which are posted on the website. 
6. The maximum game duration is 8 weeks, which corresponds to 2 hours 40 
minutes in real time; however fatigue in players often limited the games to less 
than 8 weeks. 
7. Each bidder has a capacity to work 3 jobs every week. If the bidder bids for any 
further jobs, finance charges of $500 are charged by the bank irrespective of 
whether the bidder wins that job or not. 
8. Time required to complete each job is 5 days. 
9. The work week is 6 days long (Monday to Saturday) and no work can be done on 
Sunday. 
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10. The average return on investment is assumed to be 10% (derived from long term 
construction industry standards). 
11. The construction costs are accrued daily ie. $2,000 per day for a job of $10,000. 
The bidder does not get paid if the crew does not work on a rain day. 
12. The bidder cannot increase his resources (crew and equipment) to increase the 
rate of work on job site to compensate for lost days. 
13. Chances of rain are assumed to be 27% throughout the duration of the game. 
14. For practical purposes, a 20 minute game period counts for one week in real life. 
15 minutes for bidding and 5 minutes for construction, although the 5 minutes is 
a break for the players. 
 Once the bidder was logged in, the website showed a list of currently available 
jobs open for bidding as shown on Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 ‘All Current Bids’ Page - Screenshot 
 In order to place a bid, a text box with a ‘submit’ button was visible on the right 
side of the screen. The website was programmed to reject any flawed bids, like bids 
higher than the current bid or bids higher than the remaining financial capacity of the 
bidder. Once the bid was placed, the profit and profit percentage was visible to the 
bidder. To maintain anonymity, the other bidders’ names appeared as anonymous place 
names when they made each bid. The bidders had to constantly ‘refresh’ the page to 
keep up with the current bids. This is one problem with web based systems. 
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 Figure 6 shows a screenshot of the ‘My Bids Info’ page. This screen shows the 
financial state of the bidder, a current under-construction projects and list of previously 
completed jobs. 
 If the bidder was outbid for a particular job, this information could be seen under 
‘My Active Bids’. ‘My Jobs in Progress’ bar displayed current information about the 
jobs won by the bidder. It gave information about the job number, location, awarded 
price, current construction status, any rain delays, and overall cost to date. 
 
Figure 6 ‘My Bids Info’ Page - Screenshot 
 ‘My Completed Jobs’ bar (Figure 7) showed the history of work performed by 
individual bidders. This page helps bidders to prepare their strategy for the next bids. 
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Figure 7 ‘Completed Jobs’ Page - Screenshot 
 When a bidder wanted to bid beyond his work capacity, the screen shown in 
Figure 8 would caution the bidder and would let him place the bid but pay $500 as 
finance charges. 
 
Figure 8 ‘Bank Guarantee’ Page - Screenshot 
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 By error, if any bidder tried to place a bid that was higher than the current bid, 
the website would not allow that and would display the message shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 ‘Higher Bid Price Warning’ Page - Screenshot 
 The game was designed to be played for 8 weeks, however in Gujarathi’s (2008) 
case, the bidders were fatigued by week 5 and the game was abandoned. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter outlines the original case study procedures done by Gujarathi in 
2008. All Reverse Auction studies done at Texas A&M University follow common basic 
study methods, data collection and initial analysis. Guhya (2010) developed further 
techniques for looking at the statistical properties of the game play. 
DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL STUDY 
 The number of players and distribution of number of jobs in each week in the 
Reverse Auction game make all the difference in a study. Whilst all the studies in 
Reverse Auction system have maintained similar characteristics, the main distinctive 
features in all are the two factors mentioned above.  
 In order to avoid any bias and maintain equal probability, the available number 
of jobs in every week is determined using a roll of two or three dice depending on the 
number of participants. Gujarathi’s (2008) case study had four bidders, hence twelve 
jobs could be worked on each week. With rolling two dice, the number of jobs per week 
varies from two to twelve. Thus when the number of jobs in a week is less than twelve, 
the competition amongst the bidders comes into play. This can also be explained by the 
Herfindahl Index of 2500 with four participants.  
The Department of Justice considers a value above 1800 to be concentrated and 
value in this study is not too far from that. This difference is also be compensated by all 
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participants with equal capacity and offering limited number of jobs. With a three die 
roll, there are 216 possible outcomes with the value ranging from 3 to 18. Each of the 
sixteen values ranging from 3 to 18 were plotted by Guhya (2010) against the Gaussian 
distribution, the resemblance was striking with minor differences which can be ignored 
for the purpose of the study as shown in Figure 10. A similar graph exists for two die or 
four. 
 
Figure 10 Gaussian Distribution Against Job Distribution Probability per Week (Guhya 
2010) 
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 The number of jobs per week is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 Number of Jobs per Week 
Total Jobs Jobs Bid 
Week 1 8 8 
Week 2 10 10 
Week 3 9 9 
Week 4 9 9 
Week 5 9 9 
Week 6 12 - 
Week 7 9 - 
Week 8 11 - 
Mean 9.63 9.00 
Standard deviation 1.22 0.63 
Total 77 45 
 
 Although a total of 77 jobs were available, the game was abandoned after a five 
week period corresponding to one hour forty minutes in real time. Hence the data is 
limited to the bidding that took place on 45 jobs and five weeks. 
 All four participants that participated in the study were graduate students. The 
game rules and their individual login id and password were given to them in advance. 
They were located in different rooms to eliminate any chances of discussion and direct 
collusion. 
 The game lasted for one hour forty minutes resembling five weeks of 
construction time. The total number of jobs bid on was 45 and 346 bids were recorded 
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on the Microsoft Access database. The distribution of profits made on all jobs gives 
some interesting insight as seen in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 Profit Distribution 
 Guhya (2010) established a game theory for Reverse Auction game that included 
an equation for the form of contracts. 
                                                           Bj = K + Ξj Γ,                                                        (3) 
Γ represents the upper limit the υ player is prepared to pay in the game above the 
nominal minimum bid amount K. A negative Ξj represents a loss on direct costs to the λi 
player who makes this type of bid, and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt 
player. Guhya (2010) also concluded that comparing Ξ can allow a direct comparison 
with different studied as Ξ is a normalized value of the amount the υ player is willing to 
accept under the rules of the game. Thus when the data in Figure 12 is normalized and 
represented in the form of Ξ, the graph can be compared directly with similar graphs of 
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other studies. The issue is that different groups of players will accept a different upper 
bound to the game. The normalization adjusts all player groups to an equal footing. 
 
Figure 12 Normalization of Profit Percentages  
 Values of the normalized date range from just about zero to one. When this range 
is divided into ten parts of size 0.1, the number of values of Ξ occurring in each part 
gives the frequency. This assists in directly comparing profit results and reading the data 
in a different form. Table 5 gives these frequencies. 
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Table 5 Frequency of Values of Ξ 
Ξ Range Number 
Less than 0 0 
0 - 0.1 4 
0.11 - 0.2 6 
0.21 - 0.3 3 
0.31 - 0.4 0 
0.41 - 0.5 0 
0.51 - 0.6 3 
0.61 - 0.7 3 
0.71 - 0.8 1 
0.81 - 0.9 3 
0.91 - 1.0 4 
 
Figure 13 plots these values to give a graphical representation. 
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Figure 13 Histogram of Frequency of Ξ 
 Figure 14 gives each participant’s share of winning bids in percentages. 
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Figure 14 Percentage of Jobs Won by Each Bidder 
INCONSISTENCY IN DATA 
 This study only uses the data recorded in Gujarathi’s case study. However there 
were some inconsistencies observed when conducting this statistical analysis. The 
Microsoft Access database does not show any bids recorded on job IDs from 28 to 39 as 
shown in Figure 15.  Also the database shows record of bids on job IDs from 43 to 52, 
there is no data showing the job cost and the profit made on winning bids. Hence these 
job IDs are not considered under this study.  
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Figure 15 Missing Bid Data 
 Table 6 shows the bid data summary for each week. 
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Table 6 Bidding Data 
Jobs per Week 
 Total Jobs Jobs Bid Job Data Recorded 
Week 1 8 8 8 
Week 2 10 10 10 
Week 3 9 9 9 
Week 4 9 9 3 
Week 5 9 9 - 
Week 6 12 - - 
Week 7 9 - - 
Week 8 11 - - 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The research objectives for this study are similar to study completed by Guhya 
(2010): 
1. Establish plots of the bidding data 
2. Compare the bidding patterns shown in the plots with time for all bidders 
3. Determine if evidence exists in the bidding data to confirm the existence of the ω 
game and does it represent some form of collusion 
4. Compare the returns of the different bidders in the α game to determine are there 
are any differences in bidding returns and does it represent some form of 
collusion 
 The data from Gujarathi’s (2008) case study is comprehensively re-analyzed. The 
trend periods determined in Gujarathi’s data are compared with the trend periods 
analyzed in van Vleet’s data (2004) by Guhya (2010). This comparison enables us to 
verify the trend periods postulated by Chauhan (2009). 
 Further results from the descriptive statistics for the bid data provide data to 
establish plots of the bidding data. 
 In order to confirm the presence of the ω game and any collusion between 
players, results from descriptive statistics for the job cost data would be used. These 
results would also establish plots of bidding data. 
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 For every individual bidder, their bid period statistics are studied to give bidding 
history and graphically represent it. Later the bid data is converted to statistics with 
respect to the dollar difference in the winning and next higher bid. This differential bid 
statistics provide basis to investigate tacit collusion amongst bidders. 
COMPARING BIDDING TRENDS 
 Chauhan (2009) postulated that all Reverse Auction Bidding systems show 
distinct set of four different periods. The job profit data from van Vleet’s case study 
analyzed by Guhya (2010) is given in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 Job Profit Data from van Vleet (Guhya 2010) 
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 Guhya establishes the same bidding trends given in Table 7. 
Table 7 Trend Periods in van Vleet’s Data 
Job ID Trend Characteristic 
1 to 20 Learning 
21 to 40 Discovering 
41 to 51 Competitive 
52 to76 Profit 
 
The data from Gujarathi’s case study showed an interesting pattern similar to the 
four trend periods postulated by Chauhan (2009). These bidding patterns are said to be 
observed in a typical Reverse Auction system. It is observed from Figure 17 that the 
bidders started the game with high bids. Then as the competition grew, their bid amounts 
dropped. As the game progressed the bidders developed proficiency and maximized their 
profits towards the end. The bid amounts range from $14,000 to $30,000. 
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Figure 17 Bid Distribution 
It is considered from Figure 18 that the competition amongst the bidders caused 
the winning bids to drop considerably to $14,000 from Job Number 9 to 18, as is usual in 
Reverse Auction game play. Then the bidders seem to have developed a game play 
understanding and started winning the jobs at a much higher price and won most of the 
later jobs (from 19 to 42) at a consistently higher bid amount. This graph strongly 
suggests the tacit collusion exists amongst the bidders. However what caused the sudden 
rise in prices or what behavior of the bidders caused it is not clear from the results.  
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Figure 18 Distribution of Winning Bids 
In order to observe the bidding trends in the data, the data in Figure 18 had to be 
converted from bidding amounts to the profit percentages to accurately identify the 
trends postulated by Chauhan (2009) as seen in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Job Profit Data Relative to Costs 
Figure 20 shows a linear trend line fitted to the data in Figure 19. The positive 
slope of the line shows an increase in the profit percentages. However the scattered 
nature of the plot does not make the trend a good fit. This is also clear from the statistical 
value of R2 = 0.23. 
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Figure 20 Job Profit Data Relative to Costs with Addition of Trend Line 
Due to the imprecise fit of the linear trend line, Rogers (2010) suggested that a 
fifth order polynomial trend line be fitted to the data to reveal a better nature of the plot 
as shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21 Job Profit Data Relative to Costs with Polynomial Trend Line 
We observe that the R2 value has significantly gone up to 0.74. Although not 
very accurate, the trend line reveals the changes in the bidding patterns. According to 
Nichols (2010), these patterns are typically observed if all participants have no prior 
experience in Reverse Auctions.  
Figure 22 identifies the bidding trends that are postulated by Chauhan (2009). 
The bidders start with higher bids, then as the competition rises, their profits drop until λi 
player discovers that the competition has lowered their profits and then starts winning 
jobs at a higher profit. The other players learn quickly and that is followed by a long 
period of high profits.  
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Figure 22 Identifying the Bidding Trends in Gujarathi’s Data 
These periods are summarized in Table 8. 
Table 8 Chauhan’s Postulated Bidding Trend Periods 
Job ID Trend Characteristic Comment 
0 to 6 Discovering Characterized by small bursts of profits 
7 to 18 Competitive All players repetitively making low profits 
19 to 42 Profit Overall high profits by all bidders 
It can be confirmed that the trend periods are significantly distinct from each 
other by performing a Student’s t-Test. The values from the three periods can be cross 
tested by forming six pairs of data. Thus Table 9 shows three values across and confirms 
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that each data pair comes from a different data set having different statistical 
characteristics. 
Table 9 Comparison of Data Using Student’s T-Test 
Stage 1 2 3 
1 - 2.44 4.35 
2 - 9.88 
On comparing the Gujarathi’s data to van Vleet’s data based on job profit data, 
the trend periods do show some resemblance. However they also show significant 
differences. The first striking difference is in the learning phase. Guhya’s analysis shows 
that the learning phase is characterized by constant lower amount bids, whereas in 
Gujarathi’s data, the learning phase is absent as the bidders start the game with high 
amount bids. This could be due to the difference in the number of bidders in the two case 
studies, the personality types of the bidders or different learning curves of the 
participating bidders. The other key distinction is in the final trend of profit gain. The 
comparison between the two data sets is summarized in Table 10.  
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Table 10 Comparison of Trend Periods 
Trend 
Characteristic Van Vleet Gujarathi 
Learning Extended period, relatively lower profits Not observed 
Discovering Profits rising Short but similar 
Competitive Consistent low profits Very similar 
Profit Gain Long period, high profits Similar 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE BID DATA 
Every bidder plays the Reverse Auction Bidding game with his unique set of 
strategies. In order to look further into this, bid data needs to be studied with respect to 
the frequency of bids per job per week given by Table 11. 
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Table 11 Frequency of Bids per Job per Week 
Week Jobs Bids 
1 8 13 
2 10 119 
3 9 16 
4 9 58 
5 9 140 
6 - - 
7 - - 
8 - - 
Total 45 346 
 
The bid data shows considerable variation in the rate of bidding. This is also due 
to the data missing for Job IDs 28 to 39. Next step would be to compare the number of 
bids placed by each bidder to the number of jobs won. This is given in Table 12. 
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Table 12 Comparing Number of Bids to Number of Jobs Won by Bidders 
Rank Participant Bids Placed Jobs Won 
1 3 77 8 
2 2 101 12 
3 1 88 6 
4 4 80 4 
 Total 346 30 
 
 Clearly some bidders are more efficient at bidding than the other. It is clear that 
there is no direct relationship between the number of bids placed to jobs won. This 
makes it clear that the high ranking bidder used some strategy to outbid the lower 
ranking bidders. This is an area of future research. 
 Also, bidder ranking 2, won more jobs than bidder ranking 1. So bidder 1’s 
average profit per job must be higher than that of bidder 2. Table 13 summarizes the 
profit data for every bidder. 
 55
Table 13 Profit Data for Each Bidder 
Rank Participant Loan ($) Profit ($) 
1 3 11500 84257 
2 2 12500 76205 
3 1 4500 69987 
4 4 4000 47629 
 
 Here, the relationship between the loan amount and profit made shows that the 
higher the loan amount used in the game typically results in a higher profit in the game. 
The relationship is not exact, but it has been found in other case studies. This can be 
illustrated by plotting the two variables in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23 Comparing the Loan Amount to the Profit Made 
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 According to Nichols (2010), bid efficiency of bidders may be a gauge of their 
success. Table 14 shows the bid efficiency data. 
Table 14 Bid Efficiency of Bidders 
Rank Bidder Bids Placed Jobs Won Bid Efficiency (%) 
1 3 77 8 10.39 
2 2 101 12 11.88 
3 1 88 6 6.82 
4 4 80 4 5.00 
 Total 346 30 8.67 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE WINNING JOB DATA 
 Table 15 shows the profit efficiency of all bidders. 
Table 15 Profit Efficiency of Bidders 
Rank Bidder Profit ($) Profit Efficiency ($) 
1 3 84257 10532.13 
2 2 76205 6350.42 
3 1 69987 11664.50 
4 4 47629 11907.25 
TOTAL 278078 9269.27 
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 Ironically the bidder having lowest ranking and lowest number of bids has the 
highest profit efficiency followed by the next low ranking bidder. The conclusion is that 
seeking higher profit may not yield the greatest number of jobs or the highest overall 
returns.  
Table 16 shows the profit efficiency of the bidders in van Vleet’s data and here 
too there does not seem to be any relation between the profit efficiency and profit 
rankings of the bidders. 
Table 16 Profit Efficiency of Bidders from van Vleet’s Data 
Rank Bidder Profit ($) Profit Efficiency ($) 
1 5 91673 5392.50 
2 3 59170 2689.50 
3 4 53025 4078.00 
4 1 37559 2347.00 
5 2 24650 3081.25 
 
Figure 24 shows the number of jobs won by each bidder. 
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Figure 24 Jobs Won by Bidders 
 The next stage would be to study the profit percentages of individual bidders. 
This data would give insight whether any pattern or relationship exists in the data. 
Figures 25 to 28 plot profit percentages of individual bidders with respect to the jobs 
won. Figure 29 shows the profit percentages for all bidders in the game. 
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Figure 25 Profit Percentages - Bidder 1 
 
Figure 26 Profit Percentages - Bidder 2 
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Figure 27 Profit Percentages - Bidder 3 
 
Figure 28 Profit Percentages - Bidder 4 
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Figure 29 Profit Percentages - All Bidders 
Figures 30 to 33 show the frequency of each bidder winning in each profit 
percentage range and Figure 34 combines the frequency of all bidders. 
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Figure 30 Frequency of Winning Bids in Profit Percentage - Bidder 1 
 
Figure 31 Frequency of Winning Bids in Profit Percentage - Bidder 2 
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Figure 32 Frequency of Winning Bids in Profit Percentage - Bidder 3 
 
Figure 33 Frequency of Winning Bids in Profit Percentage - Bidder 4 
 64
 
Figure 34 Frequency of Winning Bids in Profit Percentage - All Bidders 
BID PERIOD COMPARISON 
 Tables 17 to 21 outline the bidding behavior with respect to time. It is observable 
that every bidder has a different bidding strategy and they all get aggressive towards the 
end of every bidding week.  
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Table 17 Bids Made per Minute - Bidder 1 
 
4:00-
4:15 
4:20-
4:35 
4:40-
4:55 
5:00-
5:15 
5:20-
5:35 
5:40-
5:55 
Total 
Bids 
1 0 2 0  0 0 2 
2 0 2 0  0 1 3 
3 0 2 0  0 0 2 
4 0 4 0  0 1 5 
5 3 0 0  0 0 3 
6 1 3 0  0 0 4 
7 0 1 3  2 0 6 
8 0 6 1  1 3 11 
9 0 6   0 4 10 
10 0 1   0 0 1 
11 0 2   2 4 8 
12 0 3   1 5 9 
13 0 2   2 5 9 
14 0 7   1 7 15 
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Table 18 Bids Made per Minute - Bidder 2 
 
4:00-
4:15 
4:20-
4:35 
4:40-
4:55 
5:00-
5:15 
5:20-
5:35 
5:40-
5:55 
Total 
Bids 
1 0 0 0  3 5 8 
2 0 3 0  2 0 5 
3 0 3 0  2 1 6 
4 0 1 0  0 1 2 
5 1 2 0  3 1 7 
6 0 0 0  0 2 2 
7 0 1 1  0 3 5 
8 1 1 1  0 2 5 
9 0 2   2 9 13 
10 1 0   0 4 5 
11 1 2   0 5 8 
12 0 2   4 5 11 
13 0 2   1 4 7 
14 0 2   5 9 16 
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Table 19 Bids Made per Minute - Bidder 3 
 
4:00-
4:15 
4:20-
4:35 
4:40-
4:55 
5:00-
5:15 
5:20-
5:35 
5:40-
5:55 
Total 
Bids 
1 0 0 0  2 0 2 
2 0 2 0  3 0 5 
3 0 1 0  1 2 4 
4 0 3 0  0 1 4 
5 0 0 0  0 2 2 
6 0 1 1  0 0 2 
7 0 1 3  0 1 5 
8 0 2 2  0 0 4 
9 0 2   2 0 4 
10 2 0   2 3 7 
11 1 3   0 3 7 
12 0 3   1 4 8 
13 0 2   0 4 6 
14 1 5   4 7 17 
 
 68
Table 20 Bids Made per Minute - Bidder 4 
 
4:00-
4:15 
4:20-
4:35 
4:40-
4:55 
5:00-
5:15 
5:20-
5:35 
5:40-
5:55 
Total 
Bids 
1 0 2 0  2 0 4 
2 0 0 0  2 2 4 
3 0 4 0  0 1 5 
4 0 5 0  2 1 8 
5 0 0 0  1 2 3 
6 0 0 0  0 0 0 
7 0 2 3  0 5 10 
8 0 3 1  2 4 10 
9 0 6   0 3 9 
10 0 1   0 4 5 
11 0 0   0 2 2 
12 0 1   1 0 2 
13 0 3   1 4 8 
14 1 5   1 3 10 
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Table 21 Bids Made per Minute - All Bidders 
 
4:00-
4:15 
4:20-
4:35 
4:40-
4:55 
5:00-
5:15 
5:20-
5:35 
5:40-
5:55 
Total 
Bids 
1 0 4 0  7 5 16 
2 0 7 0  7 3 17 
3 0 10 0  3 4 17 
4 0 13 0  2 4 19 
5 4 2 0  4 5 15 
6 1 4 1  0 2 8 
7 0 5 10  2 9 26 
8 1 12 5  3 9 30 
9 0 16   4 16 36 
10 3 2   2 11 18 
11 2 7   2 14 25 
12 0 9   7 14 30 
13 0 9   4 17 30 
14 2 19   11 26 58 
 
The data in tables 17 to 21 when plotted in a histogram form, the late bidding 
phenomena is evident in the results. This is entirely consistent with the findings of 
Guhya, Figures 35 to 39 shows the plots. 
 70
 
Figure 35 Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 1 
 
Figure 36 Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 2 
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Figure 37 Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 3 
 
Figure 38 Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 4 
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Figure 39 Bid Distribution per Minute - All Bidders 
 The plots show that overall the bidders start slow and big aggressively in the last 
five minutes, except for Bidder 4 whose bidding rate was somewhat constant over the 
bidding period. However this bidder achieved the lowest return on investment.  
 Bidder 3 with the highest economic gain always bid aggressive in the last three 
minutes, whereas Bidder 2 with highest number of winning bids bid aggressive at the 
start, around minute nine and again in the last two minutes. 
 Table 22 shows the high, low and average bids per minute during the duration of 
the game. 
 73
Table 22 Highest, Lowest and Average Bids per Minute 
Minutes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
High 7 7 10 13 4 4 10 12 16 11 14 14 17 26 
Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 2 
Average 3.5 3.5 5 6.5 2 2 5 6.5 8 6.5 8 7 8.5 14 
 
These values are plotted in Figure 40. 
 
Figure 40 Highest, Lowest and Average Bids per Minute 
 The average bids per minute show a graduate increase in number of bids and 
grows high in the last two minutes of the game. The rise in average bids around minute 
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four and nine can be attributed to the players who were constantly aggressive throughout 
the game. 
 
Figure 41 Average Bids per Minute 
 Figure 41 shows a fifth order polynomial fitted to the data. The clear increase at 
the last minute of the bidding period is evident. Figure 42 shows the distribution of the 
number of bids per minute made by Bidder 1. This participant bids at gradually 
increasing rate with the highest bids at minute nine and fourteen. His bids almost double 
in the last one minute. Bidder 1 was the third in profit ranking and won 20% of the jobs 
(6 jobs). A third order polynomial trend line has been used to show the trend. 
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Figure 42 Histogram Showing Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 1 
 Figure 43 shows the distribution of the number of bids per minute made by 
Bidder 2. This bidder is the most aggressive bidder with the highest number of bids 
(101). The bidder bids aggressively all through the game and doubles the bids in the last 
one minute. Bidder 2 was the second in profit ranking, with the highest number of 
winning jobs that accounted for 40% of the jobs (12 jobs). A third order polynomial 
trend line has been used to show the trend. 
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Figure 43 Histogram Showing Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 2 
 Figure 44 shows the distribution of the number of bids per minute made by 
Bidder 3. This bidder does not bid aggressively until the last minute when bidder 3 
almost tripled the number of bids. This bidder was the highest in profit ranking and won 
27% of the jobs (8 jobs). This bidder also had the lowest total number of bids. The 
strategy adopted by this bidder is intriguing and promises to be a future research topic. A 
third order polynomial trend line has been used to show the trend. 
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Figure 44 Histogram Showing Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 3 
 Figure 45 shows the distribution of the number of bids per minute made by 
Bidder 4. This bidder had a somewhat constant rate of bidding. The highest number of 
bids were recorded in the middle of the bidding period and at the end. This bidder ranked 
last in profit rankings. This bidder won only four jobs or 13% jobs. A third order 
polynomial trend line has been used to show the trend. 
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Figure 45 Histogram Showing Bid Distribution per Minute - Bidder 4 
 From the bid distribution seen in Figures 42 to 45, it can be observed that bidder 
3 who obtained the highest in profit, had a steady rate of bidding with the curve sharply 
rising only in the last minute. Thus, bidder 3 did not lose out money by placing too many 
bids and made the highest return as compared to all bidders.  
In contrast, bidder 2 bid aggressively from the start, continued bidding in the 
midsection to the end of the bid period. Result was that bidder 2 had the most number of 
bids, won the most number of jobs, and however this bidder did not make the highest 
profit as the bidder lost money every time a bid was placed. Comparing the bid 
distribution from all bidders, it can be said that a successful strategy to maximize returns 
would be to not bid aggressively at the start, have a low rate of bidding through the 
bidding period and place the most bids in the last few minutes of the bid period. The 
 79
same result can be seen from van Vleet’s data in the bid distribution analysis of the 
highest ranking bidder, done by Guhya (2010) shown in Figure 46.  
 
Figure 46 Histogram Showing Bid Distribution per Minute - Highest Ranking Bidder 
from van Vleet’s Case Study 
Table 23 presents the data for the trend lines. There does not seem to be any 
visible relationship between the coefficients and the profit rankings after plotting the 
coefficients. 
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Table 23 Coefficients of Third Order Polynomial Trend Line 
Ranking Bidder Constant x x2 x3 Comment 
1 3 1.7163 1.349 -0.276 0.0174 Aggressive late 
3 2 8.8312 -1.8971 0.2286 -0.0051 Aggressive 
2 1 -0.8222 2.2496 -0.2905 0.0143 Aggressive after minute 8 
4 4 1.019 2.3717 -0.3472 0.0153 Low rate 
 
DIFFERENTIAL BID DATA 
 Differential Bid Data corresponds to the price difference between the winning 
bid and the second last bid (Guhya 2010). Under the rules of the game, a bid lower in 
price from the current bid even by $1 is an acceptable bid. This fact is often overlooked 
by the bidders as seen in the data in Tables 24 to 28. 
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Table 24 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs Won by Bidder 1 
Job ID Price Difference in Lowest 2 Bids 
3 0 
15 100 
18 10 
25 0 
26 1 
42 1 
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Table 25 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs Won by Bidder 2 
Job ID Price Difference in Lowest 2 Bids ($) 
1 1200 
5 10000 
7 14000 
8 0 
9 14000 
10 400 
14 400 
16 100 
17 15500 
24 1 
40 499 
41 499 
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Table 26 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs Won by Bidder 3 
Job ID Price Difference in Lowest 2 Bids ($) 
2 500 
6 0 
12 700 
13 500 
19 0 
21 0 
22 0 
23 0 
 
Table 27 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs Won by Bidder 4 
Job ID Price Difference in Lowest 2 Bids ($) 
4 1000 
11 100 
20 0 
27 1 
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Table 28 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs 
Price Difference in Lowest 2 Bids ($) 
Bidder ID 
1 2 3 4 
Job ID 
1 1200 
2 500 
3 0 
4 1000 
5 10000 
6 0 
7 14000 
8 0 
9 14000 
10 400 
11 100 
12 700 
13 500 
14 400 
15 100 
16 100 
17 15500 
18 10 
19 0 
20 0 
21 0 
22 0 
23 0 
24 1 
25 0 
26 1 
27 1 
40 499 
41 499 
42 1 
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 As implied by the game rules, every subsequent bid had to be lower than the 
previous bid only by $1. From Tables 24 to 28, it can be seen that most of the players 
seem to have overlooked this point. With every lower bid, the players lost money, so to 
lower a bid by a substantial amount was not necessarily a good strategy for making high 
profits. Although it might win a bidder more jobs, the bidder would lose profit. In order 
to win jobs without losing profit, the best strategy would be to lower a bid by the least 
dollar amount permitted by the game rules; $1 in this game. The bidder who exploited 
this rule turned out to make the most profit.  
The best example is bidder 2 who lost the most money, won the most number of 
jobs, but did not make the highest profit. Bidder 3 on the other hand, realized this aspect 
of the game at the start and as a result made the highest profit. This game winning 
strategy can also be verified from the data in van Vleet’s case study given in Table 29 
where bidder 5 was the highest ranking bidder. 
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Table 29 Differential Bid Data on All Jobs from van Vleet’s Data 
Price Difference in Lowest 2 Bids ($) 
Bidder ID 
1 2 3 4 5 
Job ID 
1 149 
2 99 
3 1 
4 999 
5 250 
6 1 
7 150 
8 1 
9 1 
10 299 
11 650 
12 25 
13 100 
14 200 
15 50 
16 300 
17 200 
19 68100 
20 67350 
21 1000 
22 188000 
23 1000 
26 4000 
27 14300 
28 15000 
29 500 
30 5000 
31 76775 
32 14000 
33 3000 
34 4000 
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Table 29 continued 
 Price Difference in Lowest 2 Bids ($) 
Bidder ID 
1 2 3 4 5 
Job ID 
35 1999 
36 3000 
37 2000 
38 1000 
39 2000 
40 2000 
41 1000 
42 3000 
43 500 
44 500 
45 800 
46 1999 
47 900 
48 500 
49 1000 
50 500 
51 100 
52 500 
53 1 
54 3500 
55 500 
56 500 
57 500 
58 7500 
59 2500 
60 1000 
61 5000 
62 11000 
63 12000 
64 1999 
65 5500 
66 1000 
67 2500 
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Table 29 continued 
 Price Difference in Lowest 2 Bids ($) 
Bidder ID 
1 2 3 4 5 
Job ID 
68 100 
69 750 
70 5000 
71 6500 
72 7099 
74 1 
75 1000 
76 1 
77 145 
78 145 
 
Table 30 looks at the money lost in winning bids by participants in order of their 
profit rankings. 
Table 30 Money Lost in Winning Bids 
Ranking Bidder Average Money Lost ($) 
Std Dev of Money 
Lost ($) 
1 3 213 300 
2 2 4717 6520 
3 1 19 40 
4 4 275 485 
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 It is interesting to note that Bidder 1 lost far less money in winning bids than the 
rest. Although this bidder ranked third in profit rankings, it is evident that the bidder 
recognized the fact that winning a job by placing bids whilst not losing money is 
essential in maintaining higher profits. On the other hand, bidder 2 lost the most money. 
It is now clear that in spite of winning the maximum number of jobs, 30% more jobs 
than the second highest bidder in winning jobs, bidder 2 still did not make the most 
profit. A closer examination of Table 28 confirms these findings. 
 Figure 47 shows a plot of the data with respect to average number of bids to jobs 
won. There seems to be an inverse relationship between the average number of bids and 
jobs won. This can be attributed to the skill of the bidders in recognizing that higher 
number of bids does not necessarily win jobs, it is a bid at the right moment and right 
value that makes all the difference. R2 value of 0.83 is high for the given amount of data 
related to human performance. 
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Figure 47 Plot Showing Average Bids per Job to Number of Jobs Won 
 Figure 48 shows the relationship between the average number of bids made to the 
amount of profit made by each bidder. This plot also seems to show an inverse 
relationship between average bids per job to profit earned. The last bidder in profit 
rankings has the most number of bids. However this could also be caused due to the 
inconsistency in the data. Investigating this is beyond the scope of this study. 
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Figure 48 Plot Showing Average Bids per Job to Profit Made 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
 
 This chapter reviews the extensive results discussed in the previous chapter. The 
areas of focus would be the bidding data and patterns. Also the α game and ω game 
would be examined to confirm the results and probe how they connect to tacit collusion 
amongst the bidders. 
 The research objectives for this study are: 
1.  Establish plots of the bidding data 
2. Compare the bidding patterns shown in the plots with time for all bidders 
3. Determine if evidence exists in the bidding data to confirm the existence of the ω 
game and does it represent some form of collusion 
4. Compare the returns of the different bidders in the α game to determine if there 
are any differences in bidding returns and does it represent some form of 
collusion 
Due to the large amount of data in Reverse Auction Bidding studies, identifying 
patterns and trends in the data is a challenge. Thus this type of study is said to ‘Data 
Rich but Analysis Poor’(Guhya 2010). 
BIDDING DATA 
 The key figures in this study were four bidders who played the game designed by 
van Vleet. The game was played for a period of five work weeks. The data successfully 
recorded information on thirty jobs and 346 bids. The job distribution week was 
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determined by a roll of two dice. The total number of outcomes are 36 whose 
distribution is quite similar to the Gaussian Distribution as shown in Figure 10 (page 33) 
(Guhya 2010). 
 The first step into looking for tacit collusion is normalization of the profit made 
by each bidder given in Figure 19. The histogram of the normalized results is a chief tool 
in determining the driving force behind the competition and game α. In order to look 
further for tacit collusion, the more able bidders whose average return or profit is higher 
than the rest, should be observed. 
BIDDING PATTERNS 
 The four distinct bidding patterns in the learning curve of bidders new to the 
game of Reverse Auction Bidding were put forward by Chauhan (2009). The presence of 
the bidding patterns was confirmed in Gujarathi’s data by performing a Student’s t-test. 
However when the results were compared with van Vleet’s data from 2004, the 
comparison was not quite the same pattern. The reason behind this could be investigated 
in future studies.  
 There are many interesting findings in the study that need further evaluation  
 such as the inverse relationship between number of bids per job to the number of 
jobs won 
 the inverse relationship between the average number of bids per job to the profit 
made is exactly the opposite what would be expected out of a study in bidding. 
 The player who had the highest profit efficiency also had the lowest amount of 
returns and won the least number of jobs. What were this bidder’s strategies that lead the 
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bidder to gain highest returns on the jobs won but ultimately landing the bidder at 
bottom of the rankings for return on investment. Return on investment is a key indicator 
of economic ability. 
 On the other hand, the bidder who placed the maximum number of bids also won 
the most number of jobs. However the bidder profit efficiency was the lowest amongst 
all while the bidder’s profit ranking was 2. 
 Results coming from the differential bid data in Table 28 show the presence of 
canny players who learned the principle of maintaining higher levels of return very early 
in the game and beat the competition early. It is one of the indicators of the α game. The 
profit percentages are highly varied amongst the bidders over time and this confirms the 
presence of the ω game.  
GAME ω 
 The basic concept of a Reverse Auction is to minimize the average costs of 
goods or services to the υ player. The υ player sets the rules of the game and has to 
accept bids that fall within those rules. The only way to judge the success of the process 
is the average cost of the job that the υ player has to settle with.  
 Although a Reverse Auction promises in some ways to be an economically better 
alternative to the widely used hard-bid system, professionals in the construction industry 
are skeptical about its use, one of the reasons being tacit collusion that obliterates the 
main motive of the υ player. The presence of two sub-games in the Reverse Auction 
Bidding game, termed as the ω game and α game was postulated by Nichols (2010). The 
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ω game is played between the bidders (λi player) and the υ player whereas the α game is 
a multiplayer game between the λ players.  
 In all the Reverse Auction Bidding studies conducted at Texas A&M University, 
there is no evidence that the υ player is able to succeed in reducing the average costs. 
The same was demonstrated in this study with all players gaining high profit levels even 
with the competition. 
GAME α 
 In this sub-game, the λi players are playing between them with an intention to 
maximize their average returns. The results of this study show that some players are able 
to gain much higher returns as compared to their competitors over the period of time. 
Since the first study completed by van Vleet in 2004, many consequent studies have 
tried to address this issue and determine the cause. 
 Analysis of Gujarathi’s case study has suggested that the α game begins when a 
λi player places a bid on a job. After the bid is placed, there are two possibilities: 
1. The λi player will not face any competition; the bid will remain in the system 
until the set time ends and the λi player will win the job. 
2. The initial bid will be undercut by another bidder. There are three possible 
scenarios after that: 
a) The bid will be undercut by the minimum offered limit of the game ($1 in 
this case) 
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b) The bid will be undercut by a significantly higher amount than the offered 
limit of the game (in the case of job ID 17, the winning bid cut the second 
lowest bid by $15,500) 
c) The subsequent bid will be lower than the cost of executing the job 
 In case of the first possibility, this is the ideal case for the λi players as it 
maximizes this bidder’s return. However it is the worst scenario for the υ player as it will 
offer the purchaser the highest cost. These possibilities have occurred in Gujarathi’s 
study in Job IDs 6, 19 to 23 and 25 where the initial offered high price bid was never 
undercut. 
 In case of possibility 2a, here the α game really becomes a two player game. This 
strategy is best in terms of the λi players as it helps to keep their returns high while being 
under the rules of the game. The υ player again clearly loses the game. Gujarathi’s data 
shows how the bidders missed this point initially in the game, but learnt it soon to gain 
consistent high profits. Job IDs 24, 26, 27 and 42 demonstrate this case. 
 In case of possibility 2b, the λi players are clearly losing out on the game rules. 
Even though 2a is in their best economic interest, the occurrence of 2b is more prevalent 
than 2a. The study shows that 2b takes place in the initial game play when all the bidders 
have no prior experience with Reverse Auction Bidding. As they get past their learning 
curve, their game shifts from 2b to 2a. Table 26 shows this case. 
 The occurrence of 2c is only possible when the λi player makes a mistake or 
clerical error on the bid. This case has been documented on previous studies done on 
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Reverse Auction Bidding. However this can be controlled by setting the rules on the 
game. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Reverse Auction case study completed by Gujarathi in 2008 reveals 
intriguing characteristics of the Reverse Auction game. The game was conducted using 
the same website developed by van Vleet (2004), who used an ASP and Microsoft 
Access database to record the game. This study has statistically analyzed the data 
recorded in Gujarathi’s case study and examined the bidding patterns and bidding 
behavior of the participants.  
The game scenario was developed by van Vleet where each job was to construct 
a slab for a home builder. There were four bidders in this game and each had a capacity 
to undertake three jobs per week. They also had an option to increase their capacity by 
paying fees to a bank. The construction took place over six sites around the Houston TX 
area. The game recorded five weeks of bidding activity, with a total of thirty jobs and 
three hundred and forty six bids. The details of the statistical analysis are given in the 
results chapter of this study. It is concluded the presence of two different games in the 
Reverse Auction system can clarify the tacit collusion that is observed in the players of 
the game. 
 The ω game, the first game, is the real objective function of the Reverse Auction 
system. This game is a two player game between the purchaser (υ player) and the set of 
bidders (λi players). The intention of this game is to lower the average cost of jobs for 
the purchaser, as it is the purchaser that creates and operates the game. The purchaser 
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wins the game by creating economic pressure on the bidders and getting the lowest bids 
to complete the jobs, thus saving the purchaser on total costs.  
However, the bidders can win this game by increasing the average cost of jobs, 
thus maximizing their overall returns. The study shows that under the rules of the game, 
able bidders can gain higher profits. 
 The α game is the second game and more implicit game. It is multiplayer game 
played amongst the bidders (λi players). It is this game that provides a huge profit 
making opportunity to the canny bidders. The bidders are competing with each other to 
maximize their profits and gain an economic advantage over the other bidders. By taking 
advantage of the game play strategy as explained in the analysis of results chapter, the 
bidders can gain increased returns that put them ahead from the other bidders. 
 Thus the common conception that Reverse Auction Bidding systems reduce the 
costs for the purchaser as compared to hard bid system, is probably wrong. Under the 
rules set in this game, some bidders were able to achieve higher than average results.  
 The study also puts worth a future area of research in developing the game in 
ways that the tacit collusion can be eliminated, minimized or controlled in some form by 
the purchaser so that the true motive of getting lower costs can be achieved for the 
bidder. 
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